

Case Briefing Document

Offences

- **Corporate Manslaughter**
- **Gross Criminal Manslaughter**

Immediate action required:

Halt the roll-out of experimental treatments known as “COVID-19 Vaccines” immediately pending Police forensic examination

Defendants identified

- AstraZeneca
- Pfizer
- Moderna
- National Health Service (NHS)
- Medicines & Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA)
- Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation (JCVI)
- Her Majesty's Government

Background Statement

The British Government began a rollout of what is now referred to as “COVID-19 vaccines” in early 2021. The said ‘vaccines’ received a temporary Emergency Authorisation under Regulation 174 of the Human Medicine Regulations Act (2012).

All Phase 3 COVID-19 vaccine trials are ongoing and not due to conclude until late 2022/early 2023. The treatments are currently experimental with only 1 year of short-term data and no long-term human safety data available. It is widely accepted now that none of the COVID-19 experimental treatments prohibit infection of COVID-19 nor are they prohibiting transmission of any disease.

Scientists around the world have been reporting unusual findings when examining COVID-19 injection vial contents in an effort to ascertain what is causing reported deaths, injuries and adverse reactions.

On 20th September 2021 in the pathological institute in Reutlingen, Germany, the results of autopsies of eight people who died after COVID19 experimental treatment were presented. The fine tissue analyses were performed by pathologists Prof. Dr. Arne Burkhardt and Prof. Dr. Walter Lang. The findings confirm the previous report from Prof. Dr. Peter Schirmacher. Of more than 40 corpses he autopsied, who had died within two weeks of COVID19 experimental treatment, approximately one-third of those deaths were caused by the experimental treatment itself.

In November 2020 Dr Andreas Noack, a German chemist and one of the EU's top graphene experts, released a video explaining that he had discovered graphene hydroxide contained in the COVID-19 experimental treatments. He described how the graphene hydroxide nano structures injected into the human body act as 'razor blades' inside the veins of recipients and how they would not show up on an autopsy or normal toxicology tests given their atomic size.

On 26th November 2021, just hours after publishing his latest video about graphene hydroxide, he died in suspicious circumstances.

Professor Dr Pablo Campra, University of Almeria, Spain also examined Covid-19 experimental treatments in November 2021 using Micro-Raman Spectroscopy, the study of frequencies. He too confirmed the presence of graphene.

Post Vaccination Death & Injury Reports

It is possible to signpost you to numerous death and injury reports made by way of statements to Police and Lawyers around the UK.

It is incumbent upon medical staff in the UK to report any injury, adverse reaction or death following the injection of these experimental treatments. The MHRA (Medicines & Healthcare products Regulatory Agency) set up the Yellow Card System for this purpose and encourages the reporting of COVID-19 suspected side effects to medicines and vaccines or medical devices and diagnostic adverse incidents used in coronavirus treatment.

As of 5th January 2022, this system shows that death has been listed as an outcome related to COVID-19 experimental treatments at least 1,932 times as well as nearly one and a half million adverse reactions to the experimental treatments (1,414,293).

In the United States, VAERS (Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System) reports of Deaths have been listed as an outcome related to COVID-19 experimental treatments at least 21,745 times as of January 7, 2022 and 38,000 people are permanently disabled.

On the Euro eudraVigilance European database Death has been listed as an outcome related to COVID-19 experimental treatments at least 34,337 times as of December 18, 2021. 3.1 Million injuries have also been reported.

It follows that the rates of increase of death and significant harm are increasing as the experimental treatment programme is rolled out.

Investigation

Following her own experience with patients who had suffered apparent vaccine injury and adverse reactions, a British Medical Practitioner came forward in December 2021 offering to assist in an investigation to ascertain whether the results discovered by Dr's Noack and Campra could be replicated in the UK and also to examine the COVID-19 injection vials for discovery of toxins or unexpected contents.

The medical practitioner seized an injection vial from the fridge housed in the surgery in which she works and handed it to an independent investigator assisting in investigating cases relating to injury sustained as a result of injections given as part of the roll out.

Further vials have since been obtained which cover the three main manufacturers in the UK: Pfizer, Moderna and AstraZeneca.

The contents of the injection vials have been forensically examined and a laboratory report is attached to this brief. A summary of the findings are found below.

A brief summary of a toxicology report is also found below, the full document is attached.

A full peer reviewed scientific paper is expected to be provided in due course.

As soon as we had the confirmation of the laboratory report and toxicology. Ian Clayton contacted the Police (details) in line with duty of care to the Public to request immediate cessation of the experimental treatment roll-out and to make an appointment to present this evidence in person to the Police.

Chain of Evidence

1. Injection vial delivered to GP surgery
2. Injection vial collected from the GP surgery refrigerator
3. Injection vial delivered to Investigation team
4. Injection vial delivered to the Laboratory
5. Injection vial forensically examined
6. Injection vial retained for disclosure purposes

Attachments

The following documents are attached in support of this submission:

- Laboratory report
- Scientific article 'Toxicity of graphene-family nanoparticles: a general review of the origins and mechanisms'
- Layman's summary of the article 'Toxicity of graphene-family nanoparticles: a general review of the origins and mechanisms'

Laboratory Report Summary

A summary of the findings detailed in the attached quality assured report is as follows:

RAMAN Spectroscopy discovered the following particles -

- Graphene
- SP3 Carbon
- Iron Oxide
- Carbon derivatives

Toxicology Report Summary

A summary of the findings detailed in the attached toxicology report is as follows:

- Graphene nanomaterials (GFNs) can penetrate the body's natural barriers and damage the central nervous system
- Graphene oxide (GO):
 - a. can damage internal organs
 - b. damages the reproduction and development system
 - c. destroys blood health
 - d. damages and destroys cells
 - e. can trigger cancer and accelerate ageing
 - f. damages mitochondria and DNA
 - g. triggers an inflammatory response and three different kinds of cell death
 - h. causes changes in gene function

Police Submission

With the information that has been provided to you today there is more than enough reasonable suspicion that serious indictable offences have been committed.

There is also more than enough grounds for the Police to apply for a S.8 Police & Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Warrant and seize injection vials for themselves and submit these vials to a Home Office laboratory with a view to replicating our findings.

Having replicated the examinations the Police will be in possession of their own hard evidence to support serious indictable offences.

The first and foremost duty of the Police is the protection of life. It is therefore incumbent on the Police that they take action to halt the roll-out of these experimental treatments immediately and until their own forensic investigations have been completed. Again, there are reasonable grounds for doing this.

The main potential defendants in this matter, as listed above, precludes them from conducting any investigation themselves. It is a matter for the Police only.

Ian Clayton is a co-founder of a collective of people called UKCitizen2021, which was itself established by a small group of people who formerly worked within the legal profession. He is the person reporting this matter to you and is your point of contact going forward.

During the course of being involved with UKCitizen2021, Ian Clayton has amassed a plethora of contacts, information and direct access to various experts in many fields. He is more than happy to assist the Police in signposting them.

As the Police have a duty to conduct the necessary forensic tests for themselves, it is not necessary to mention the names of the people involved in this matter. Due to the fact that Dr. Noack died in suspicious circumstances following his video release about graphene hydroxide being present; the identities of the

persons involved in this private forensic investigation are withheld for security reasons.

Law

Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007

UK Public General Acts <<https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga>>2007 c. 19
<<https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/19/contents>>

1 The offence

(1)
An organisation to which this section applies is guilty of an offence if the way in which its activities are managed or organised—

- (a) causes a person's death, and
- (b) amounts to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the deceased.

(2)
The organisations to which this section applies are—

- (a) a corporation;
- (b) a department or other body listed in Schedule 1;
- (c) a police force;
- (d) a partnership, or a trade union or employers' association, that is an employer.

(3)
An organisation is guilty of an offence under this section only if the way in which its activities are managed or organised by its senior management is a substantial element in the breach referred to in subsection (1).

(4)
For the purposes of this Act—

- (a) “relevant duty of care” has the meaning given by section 2, read with sections 3 to 7;
- (b) a breach of a duty of care by an organisation is a “gross” breach if the conduct alleged to amount to a breach of that duty falls far below what can reasonably be expected of the organisation in the circumstances;
- (c) “senior management”, in relation to an organisation, means the persons who play significant roles in—
 - (i) the making of decisions about how the whole or a substantial part of its activities are to be managed or organised, or
 - (ii) the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those activities.

(5)
The offence under this section is called—

- (a) corporate manslaughter, in so far as it is an offence under the law of England and Wales or Northern Ireland;
- (b) corporate homicide, in so far as it is an offence under the law of Scotland.

(6)

An organisation that is guilty of corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine.

(7)

The offence of corporate homicide is indictable only in the High Court of Justiciary.

Gross Criminal Manslaughter

The Law

The ingredients of the offence were authoritatively set out in the leading case of *R v Adomako* [1995] 1 AC 171 in which Lord Mackay of Clashfern LC at page 187 said the following:

"In my opinion, the law as stated in these two authorities *Bateman* (1925) 19 Cr. App. R. 8 and *Andrews v DPP* [1937] AC 576 is satisfactory as providing a proper basis for describing the crime of involuntary manslaughter. Since the decision in *Andrews* was a decision of your Lordships' house, it remains the most authoritative statement of the present law which I have been able to find and it has not been departed from. On this basis, in my opinion the ordinary principles of negligence apply to ascertain whether or not the defendant has been in breach of a duty of care towards the victim who has died. If such breach of duty is established the next question is whether that breach of duty caused the death of the victim. If so, the jury must go on to consider whether that breach of duty should be characterised as gross negligence and therefore as a crime."

In order to prove the offence, the prosecution must therefore establish the following elements:

- a) The defendant owed a duty of care to the deceased;
 - b) By a negligent act or omission the defendant was in breach of the duty which he owed to the deceased;
 - c) The negligent act or omission was a cause of the death; and
 - d) The negligence, which was a cause of the death, amounts to gross negligence and is therefore a crime;
- More recently, the elements of manslaughter by gross negligence were stated concisely by the President of the Queen's Bench Division in *R v Rudling* [2016] EWCA Crim 741 at paragraph 18 as follows:

We can summarise the law shortly. The critical ingredients of gross negligence manslaughter can be taken from *R v Prentice*, *Adomako* and *Holloway* [1994] QB 302 in this court and *Adomako* [1995] 1 AC 171, [1994] 99 Crim App R 362 in the House of Lords as well as *R v Misra* [2005] 1 Cr App R 21. They can be summarised as being the breach of an existing duty of care which it is reasonably foreseeable gives rise to a serious and obvious risk of death and does, in fact, cause death in circumstances where, having regard to the risk of death, the conduct of the defendant was so bad in all the circumstances as to amount to a criminal act or omission (see *Adomako* [2005] 1 Cr App Rep at 369). The elements of GNM were set out by the House of Lords in *R v Adomako* [1995] 1 AC 171.

Other Offences

It follows that numerous other offences will have been committed by other individuals which I do not intend to detail here but which the Police will have regard to in due course.

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

UK Public General Acts <<https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/c.60>>
<<https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/contents>> Part II
<<https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/part/II>>

Search warrants

Power of justice of the peace to authorise entry and search of premises.

(1)
If on an application made by a constable a justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing—

- (a) that an indictable offence has been committed; and
 - (b) that there is material on premises mentioned in subsection (1A) below which is likely to be of substantial value (whether by itself or together with other material) to the investigation of the offence; and
 - (c) that the material is likely to be relevant evidence; and
 - (d) that it does not consist of or include items subject to legal privilege, excluded material or special procedure material; and
 - (e) that any of the conditions specified in subsection (3) below applies,
- he may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter and search the premises in relation to each set of premises specified in the application.

(1A)
The premises referred to in subsection (1)(b) above are—

- (a) one or more sets of premises specified in the application (in which case the application is for a “specific premises warrant”); or
- (b) any premises occupied or controlled by a person specified in the application, including such sets of premises as are so specified (in which case the application is for an “all premises warrant”).

(1B)
If the application is for an all premises warrant, the justice of the peace must also be satisfied—

- (a) that because of the particulars of the offence referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) above, there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is necessary to search premises occupied or controlled by the person in question which are not specified in the application in order to find the material referred to in paragraph (b) of that subsection; and
- (b) that it is not reasonably practicable to specify in the application all the premises which he occupies or controls and which might need to be searched.

(1C)
The warrant may authorise entry to and search of premises on more than one occasion if, on the application, the justice of the peace is satisfied that it is necessary to authorise multiple entries in order to achieve the purpose for which he issues the warrant.

(1D)
If it authorises multiple entries, the number of entries authorised may be unlimited, or limited to a maximum.

(2)
A constable may seize and retain anything for which a search has been authorised under subsection (1) above.

(3)
The conditions mentioned in subsection (1)(e) above are—

- (a) that it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant entry to the premises;
- (b) that it is practicable to communicate with a person entitled to grant entry to the premises but it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant access to the evidence;
- (c) that entry to the premises will not be granted unless a warrant is produced;
- (d)

that the purpose of a search may be frustrated or seriously prejudiced unless a constable arriving at the premises can secure immediate entry to them.

(4)
In this Act “relevant evidence”, in relation to an offence, means anything that would be admissible in evidence at a trial for the offence.

(5)
The power to issue a warrant conferred by this section is in addition to any such power otherwise conferred.

(6)
This section applies in relation to a relevant offence as defined in section 28 of the Immigration Act 1971) as it applies in relation to an indictable offence.

(7)
Section 4 of the Summary Jurisdiction (Process) Act 1881 (execution of process of English courts in Scotland) shall apply to a warrant issued on the application of an officer of Revenue and Customs under this section by virtue of section 114 below.

Home Office Guidelines on the Reporting and Recording of Crime

The Law

The Police Act 1996 Section 44 (2 and 3) states that the Home Secretary can require chief constables of forces in England and Wales to provide statistical data.

The HOCR also promote a victim-oriented approach (PDF document) <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/387762/count-vision-december-2014.pdf> to crime recording. This means that a belief by the victim that a crime has occurred is, in most cases, enough to justify its recording as a crime.

The crime recording process used by the police can be divided into six stages, which are set out below.

1. Incident reporting and recording

Incidents reported to the police relate to issues including public safety and welfare, crime, anti-social behaviour <<https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/glossary/anti-social-behaviour/>> and transport. There are many ways that incidents can be reported to the police:

- victims <<https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/glossary/victims/>>, witnesses or other third parties can tell a police officer, PCSO or member of staff either on the street or at the front counter of a police station;
- victims <<https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/glossary/victims/>>, witnesses or other third parties can telephone incidents to police control rooms;
- victims <<https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/glossary/victims/>>, witnesses or other third parties may report an incident online;
- the police might discover the crime themselves; or
- other agencies such as social services may refer them. It is also possible that other agencies will refer an incident that is clearly a crime.

The HOCR require that “all reports of incidents, whether from victims <<https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/glossary/victims/>>, witnesses or third parties and whether crime related or not, will result in the registration of an incident report by the police”. It goes on to specify that these must be recorded on an auditable system, which in practice means:

- an incident log (sometimes referred to as a command and control log); and/or,
- a record on the force crime system.

When recording an incident, staff allocate an “opening code” to the incident log. Opening codes indicate the nature of the incident, for example whether it relates to a road traffic accident or a burglary. Opening codes are important because they allow supervisors to see immediately what type of incidents are currently open and prioritise resources accordingly.

2. Deciding if a crime should be recorded

The HOCR require:

“An incident will be recorded as a crime (notifiable offence)

1. For offences against an identified victim if, on the balance of probability:

- The circumstances as reported amount to a crime defined by law (the police will determine this, based on their knowledge of the law and counting rules), and
- There is no credible evidence to the contrary.

2. For offences against the state the points to prove to evidence the offence must clearly be made out, before a crime is recorded.”

Because the rules place an obligation on the police to accept what the victim says unless there is “credible evidence to the contrary”, the following reasons are not enough to justify not recording a crime:

- the victim declines to give personal details;
- the victim doesn't want to take the matter further; or
- the allegation can't be proven.

In relation to the balance of probability test, the National Crime Recording Standard (which is reproduced within annex A of the HOCR (PDF document)

<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/534967/count-general-july-2016.pdf_.pdf>) notes that:

“In most cases, a belief by the victim (or person reasonably assumed to be acting on behalf of the victim) that a crime has occurred is sufficient to justify its recording as a crime, although this will not be the case in all circumstances. Effectively, a more victim orientated approach is advocated.”

“An allegation should be considered as made, at the first point of contact, i.e. the stage at which the victim or a person reasonably assumed to be acting on behalf of the victim first makes contact with the police, be that by phone, etc. or in person. If an alleged or possible victim cannot be contacted or later refuses to provide further detail, the Crime Recording Decision Making Process (CRDMP) should be based on all available first contact information.”

